

THE DIRECTOR OF  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

National Intelligence Officers

25X1

27 January 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director

FROM

The recent discovery of more Iraqi tank transporters does not have a significant impact on this table. The Arab tank counts for 1980 reflect our estimate of those tanks that would be brought to bear on the battle and we had assumed that by 1980 the Iraqis would have approximately twice as many transporters to move them. Moreover, an additional few hundred Arab tanks in the battle would not change very much the combat ratios and are certainly within the margin of error for any figures on the table.

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MORI/CDF Pages 3,4,5

THE DIRECTOR OF  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Executive Registry

76-64241

National Intelligence Officers

26 January 1976

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
TO: The Director

FROM:

Attached is a memorandum you indicated you wished to send to the President concerning Arab-Israeli force balances in the 1980s.

SECRET

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505



27 JAN 1976

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

At the 13 January NSC meeting you asked about projected Arab-Israeli force ratios for 1980, particularly in view of the Israeli structure envisaged under the MATMON B program. We have prepared a table which summarizes our analysis.

The attached table compares Arab-Israeli force balances at the time of the October 1973 War with those that could develop by 1980. The Arab force is projected on both a "worst case" (Israeli estimate) and "most likely case" (CIA-DIA estimate) basis. In both cases the Arab force is compared with:

a. Our estimate of Israel's present arms inventory augmented with US equipment already approved for and with items from Israeli domestic production.

b. The above Israeli force supplemented by those items of US equipment that Israel has requested as the first annual increment of the MATMON B plan.

c. CIA's projection of the Israeli force in 1980 if Israel were to receive all of the equipment requested in MATMON B through 1979.

d. Israel's own projection of its force in 1980 if it were to receive all of the equipment requested in MATMON B through 1979.

SECRET

Combat ratios are useful analytical tools for comparative analysis. They do not, of course, take into account the critical qualitative performance factor that has enabled Israel to win decisive victories in past wars despite quantitative equipment disadvantages.

Respectfully,

7s7 Bill

W. E. Colby

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Executive Registry

76-64241

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

The Honorable Gerald R. Ford  
The President of the United States  
Washington, D.C.

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